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Abstract. Counter-cryptanalysis, the concept of using cryptanalytic
techniques to detect cryptanalytic attacks, was first introduced by Stevens
at CRYPTO 2013 [22] with a hash collision detection algorithm. That
is, an algorithm that detects whether a given single message is part of a
colliding message pair constructed using a cryptanalytic collision attack
on MD5 or SHA-1. The concept’s utility was proven when it was used
to expose the then-unknown cryptanalytic collision attack exploited by
the Flame espionage supermalware.
So far there is a significant cost: to detect collision attacks against SHA-1
(respectively MD5) costs the equivalent of hashing the message 15 (re-
spectively 224) times. In this paper we present a significant performance
improvement for collision detection based on the new concept of unavoid-
able conditions. Unavoidable conditions are conditions that are necessary
for all feasible attacks in a certain attack class. As such they can be used
to quickly dismiss particular attack classes that may have been used in
the construction of the message. To determine an unavoidable condition
one must rule out any feasible variant attack where this condition might
not be necessary, otherwise adversaries aware of counter-cryptanalysis
could easily bypass this improved collision detection with a carefully
chosen variant attack. We provide a formal model for unavoidable con-
ditions for collision attacks on MD5-like compression functions.
Furthermore, based on a conjecture solidly supported by the current
state of the art, we show how we can determine such unavoidable con-
ditions for SHA-1. We have implemented the improved SHA-1 collision
detection using such unavoidable conditions and which is about 16 times
faster than without our unavoidable condition improvements. We have
measured that overall our implemented SHA-1 with collision detection
is only a factor 1.96 slower, on average, than SHA-1. Our work is very
timely given the recently announced first SHA-1 collision proving that
SHA-1 is now practically broken.
1 Introduction
Cryptographic hash functions, computing a small fixed-size hash value for a given
message of arbitrary length, are a crucial cryptographic primitive that are used
to secure countless systems and applications. A key cryptographic requirement
is that it should be computationally infeasible to find collisions: two distinct
messages with the same hash value. Industry’s previous de facto choices MD5
and SHA-1 are both based on the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction [17, 5] that
iterates a compression function that updates a fixed-size internal state called
the chaining value (CV) with fixed-size pieces of the input message.
In 2004, MD5 was completely broken and real collisions were presented by
Wang et al.[29, 31]. Their collision attack consisted of two so-called near-collision
attacks on MD5’s compression function where the first introduces a difference
in the chaining value and the second eliminates this difference again. Hence,
these so-called identical-prefix collisions had a limitation that the two collid-
ing messages need to be identical before and after these near-collision blocks.
In 2007 Stevens et al.[25] introduced chosen-prefix collisions for MD5 that al-
lowed arbitrary different prefixes. Irrefutable proof that hash function collisions
indeed form a realistic and significant threat to Internet security was presented
at CRYPTO 2009 by Stevens et al. [26] by demonstrating a certificate authority
that could issue two Certs with different keys that have the same hash value.
More proof of the threat posed by collision attacks appeared in 2012 when it
became clear that not only academic efforts have been spent on breaking hash
functions. Nation-state actors [19, 13, 12] have been linked to the highly advanced
espionage malware, so named Flame, that was found targeting the Middle-East
in May 2012. As it turned out, it used a forged signature to craft malicious
windows updates. Using the new technique of counter-cryptanalysis, which is able
to expose cryptanalytic collision attacks given only one message from a colliding
message pair, it was proven that the forged signature was made possible by a yet
unknown chosen-prefix attack on MD5 [22, 6]. Despite the common knowledge
that MD5 is insecure for digital signatures effectively since 2004, even in 2017
there are still Industry issues in deprecating MD5 for signatures [9].
SHA-1, designed by NSA and standardized by NIST [18], is also weak and was
theoretically broken in 2005 with a collision attack with an estimated complex-
ity of 269 SHA-1 calls presented by Wang et al.[30]. With real collisions for full
SHA-1 out of reach so far, there have been efforts at producing collisions for re-
duced versions of SHA-1: 64 steps [2] (with a cost of 235 SHA-1 calls), 70 steps [1]
(cost 244 SHA-1), 73 steps [7] (cost 250.7 SHA-1), the last being 75 steps [8] (cost
257.7 SHA-1) from 2011. The cost of collisions for SHA-1 was improved to 261
SHA-1 calls at EUROCRYPT 2013 [23], together with a near-collision attack
with cost 257.5 and a chosen-prefix collision attack with cost 277.1 SHA-1 calls,
that remains the current state-of-the-art. Other recent efforts focused on finding
freestart collisions for SHA-1, i.e., collisions for its compression function, with
a 76-step freestart collision [11] (cost 250 SHA-1) and more recently a freestart
collision for full SHA-1 [24].
Despite various efforts, an actual collision for SHA-1 remained out of reach
for 11 years, but this year a SHA-1 collision was finally announced by Stevens
et al.[?]. This shows that SHA-1 collision attacks have finally become practical.
Furthermore, they provided several examples of PDF file pairs that have the
same SHA-1 hash, yet show distinct visual contents.
1.1 Motivation
Based on the latest results for the complexity of finding a SHA-1 collision, the
projected cost of such an attack ranges from US$ 75 K and US$ 120 K by renting
low-cost computing resources on Amazon EC2 [21, 24], which is significantly
lower than Schneier’s 2012 estimates. These projections resulted in the with-
drawal of CABForum Ballot 152 to extend issuance of SHA-1 based HTTPS
certificates, and in the deprecation of SHA-1 for digital signatures in the IETF’s
TLS protocol specification version 1.3. The recent SHA-1 collision paper further
confirms these costs [?].
Unfortunately CABForum restrictions on the use of SHA-1 do not apply on
Certification Authority certificates currently outside their CA program. E.g., it
excludes retracted CA certificates that are still supported by older systems (and
CA certificates have indeed been retracted to circumvent CABForum regulations
and continue to issue new SHA-1 certificates 3 to serve to these older systems),
and certificates for other TLS applications including up to 10% of credit card
payment systems [28]. It thus remains in widespread use across the software
industry for, e.g., digital signatures on software, documents, and many other
applications, perhaps most notably in the widely used Git versioning system.
Certainly, the spectacular end of life of MD5, including a high profile cyber-
attack on the nation state level, provided advanced warning of the end of life of
SHA-1. Indeed, the success of cryptanalytic attacks of the Merkle-Damgard con-
struction motivated the SHA-3 competition. Not to mention, inspired widespread
efforts to migrate deployed software to the longer length digest hash functions
of SHA-2 family. So, one may challenge the utility of collision detection for the
SHA-1 function, which has been known to have an impending break for some
time. However, the Flame attacks show that long after newer versions of software
have been deployed, older versions that rely on older cryptography may still be
in use and provide a vulnerability for attackers. Even with this cautionary tale,
as noted above, various software and services still issue SHA-1 certificates or use
SHA-1. So even though SHA-1 collisions have been expected for some time, it
has not been sufficient to motivate a complete migration to newer hash func-
tions. Even if systems are moved from using SHA-1, verification of signatures of
SHA-1 digests may remain necessary for existing signatures, such as deployed
binaries or not yet expired certificates.
An example is GPG/PGP email and attachment signatures where SHA-1-
based signatures remain common. E.g., Stevens et al.’s colliding PDF document
technique would allow an attacker to have someone sign and email a carefully
crafted benign PDF document with GPG/PGP using a SHA-1-based signature.
That signature would then also be valid for a malicious PDF document that was
3 E.g., SHA-1 certificates are still being sold by CloudFlare at the time of writing:
www.cloudflare.com/ssl/dedicated-certificates/.
crafted together with the benign PDF document to make them collide. Also, as
previously mentioned, another example of widely a deployed system that relies
on SHA-1 in a fundamental way is Git, which uses SHA-1 as an identifier for
commits. It is infeasible that all deployed Git repositories will be migrated off of
SHA-1, but since SHA-1 collisions are now feasible Git might be at risk. As one
scenario, consider an attacker that has committed one file of a colliding pair4 to
a Git repository under his control, in which case he could then selectively deliver
either contents to targeted users, without the users noticing by looking at Git
hashes or verifying signatures on the repository.
The aim of SHA-1 collision detection is not to obviate the need to move to
newer hash functions with longer digests. Rather, SHA-1 collision detection is
meant to be a mitigation used for deployed systems that are unable to migrate
to a new hash function. In these cases, an implementation of SHA-1 with col-
lision detection may be used as a drop in replacement. Such an update, that
requires only changing the module responsible for hashing, is significantly easier
than redeploying an entire distributed system, including revising protocols that
currently rely on SHA-1. Collision detection for SHA-1 attacks is a thorough
stop-gap solution that will provide security to systems and software that may
not be able to migrate to newer hash functions before SHA-1 collisions become
a viable security threat. The example of Git, as mentioned previously, is very
amenable to such a solution.
1.2 Collision detection
At CRYPTO 2013, Stevens introduced a Collision Detection algorithm that
given any single message can detect whether it was constructed – together with
an unknown sibling message – using a cryptanalytic collision attack on MD5
or SHA-1 [22]. It is based on two critical properties of all known cryptanalytic
collision attacks on MD5 and SHA-1, namely, they strongly depend on the use of
trivial differences δWSi in some intermediate states WSi,WS
′
i of the compression
function, and there only select few differences δB for the message blocks B,B′
that allow feasible attacks.
Collision detection detects near-collision attacks against MD5’s or SHA-1’s
compression function for a given message by ‘jumping’ from the current com-
pression function evaluation CVout = Compress(CVin, B) to a presumed related
compression function evaluation CV ′out = Compress(CV
′
in, B
′). The presumed
related compression function evaluation can be fully reconstructed using the
message block differences δB and the difference δWSi for some intermediate
state WSi after step i of the compression function. Those differences directly
imply values for B′ and WS′i which are sufficient to compute the related input
chaining value CV ′in and thereby also the related output chaining value CV
′
out.
This reconstruction from the middle of the related compression function eval-
uation is called a recompression. A collision attack necessarily requires a final
near-collision attack with CV ′out = CVout, which can be detected in this manner.
4 As Git adds a header before computing the SHA-1 hash of an object, this header
should be taken into account while constructing the SHA-1 collision.
For MD5 and SHA-1 one thus distinguishes many attack classes that each
are described by the message block difference δB, step i and intermediate state
difference δWSi. In the case of SHA-1 each attack class depends entirely on the
so-called disturbance vector (DV). In either case, for every block of the given
message, each attack class requires another compression function evaluation.
With the 223 known attack classes for MD5, collision detection costs a factor
224 more than MD5. SHA-1 collision detection costs a factor 15 more than SHA-1
given the original proposed list of 14 most threatening disturbance vectors.
2 Our contributions
In this paper we present a significant run-time performance improvement to
collision detection. This improvement is based on a new concept in cryptanalysis,
namely unavoidable conditions, which are conditions that are necessary for all
feasible attacks within a certain class of attacks. To determine an unavoidable
condition one must rule out any feasible variant attack where this condition
might not be necessary. Otherwise, adversaries aware of counter-cryptanalysis
could easily bypass this improved collision detection with a carefully chosen
variant attack.
We provide a formal framework of unavoidable conditions for collision at-
tacks on MD5-like compression functions that can be used to show that indeed
conditions are unavoidable, and we show how they can be used to speed up
collision detection.
Furthermore, we present a conjecture that SHA-1 collision attacks based on
a disturbance vector may not deviate from the prescribed local collisions for
steps 35 up to 65 to remain feasible. As the current state of art on SHA-1
collision attacks is entirely based on disturbance vectors for very compelling
reasons, and published collision attacks only deviate from local collisions in the
first 20 steps or the last 5 steps (75 up to 79), the current state of art solidly
supports this conjecture with a safe large margin. Based on this conjecture, we
show how we can efficiently determine such unavoidable conditions for the known
cryptanalytic attack classes on SHA-1. Moreover, we show how we can exploit
a significant overlap of unavoidable conditions between DVs that allows a more
efficient checking of unavoidable bit conditions for many disturbance vectors
simultaneously.
Collision detection uses recompressions, i.e., evaluations of the compression
function starting from an intermediate state to uniquely determine the input and
output chaining value for a given message block. Collision detection requires a
recompression for each tested DV for each message block of a given message.
Unavoidable bit conditions allow a significant improvement to collision detec-
tion by very quickly checking the unavoidable bit conditions per DV and only
performing a recompression when all unavoidable bit conditions for that DV are
satisfied.
We have implemented the improved SHA-1 collision detection using unavoid-
able conditions which checks 32 DVs (twice as many as previous work). The im-
proved collision detection is about 16 times faster than without our unavoidable
condition improvements. We have measured that overall our improved SHA-1
collision detection is only a factor 1.96 slower on average than SHA-1.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 3 we treat the
formal concept of unavoidable conditions and their practical applications. How
to determine them for known attack classes against SHA-1 and to maximize
the overlap between the sets of unavoidable conditions between DVs is covered
in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5 we disclose more specific details about our open-source
implementation, in particular with regards how to efficiently check unavoidable
bit conditions. We discuss performance aspects in Sect. 6.
3 Unavoidable conditions
3.1 Model
Necessary and/or sufficient bit conditions are a very useful tool for hash function
cryptanalysis as laid out by Wang et al.[31]. In effect they reduce the problem of
finding a message block pair that conforms to a differential path to the problem
of finding a message block for which the bit conditions are satisfied. As well as
reducing cost from computations over two compression function evaluations to
only one compression function evaluation, such conditions allows more effective
use of early stop techniques and advanced message modification techniques.
We define unavoidable conditions as conditions that are necessary for all fea-
sible attacks in a certain attack class. While necessary and sufficient conditions
for an attack can be easily and manually derived, determining unavoidable con-
ditions is significantly harder as it requires the analysis of all feasible attacks in a
certain attack class. We more formally define attack classes and such unavoidable
conditions in a framework that we use to actually find unavoidable conditions for
SHA-1 by showing these are necessary for all feasible attacks within an attack
class.
Our attack class definition in Thm. 1 below is rather general but captures the
functionality of many collision attacks variants (collision attack, pseudo-collision
attack, near-collision attack) against compression functions: i.e., algorithms that
output a pair of compression function inputs. Our general definition does not
describe what the input or output differences should look like or, e.g., whether
it requires specific values for CV1 and CV2. Instead such details are abstracted
away as properties of specific attack classes.
Definition 1 (Compression function attack class) For N,M ∈ N+, let H :
{0, 1}N × {0, 1}M → {0, 1}N be a compression function, then a class of at-
tacks C against H is a set of (randomized) algorithms A that produce a tuple
(CV1, B1, CV2, B2) ∈ {0, 1}N × {0, 1}M × {0, 1}N × {0, 1}M as output.
We model an unavoidable condition for an attack class as a predicate over
pairs (CV,B) of a chaining value and message block. Such a predicate is called
an unavoidable condition if and only if it holds for all possible (CV1, B1) and
(CV2, B2) that may be output by any attack in the attack class.
Algorithm 1: Improved collision detection
Let H : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}M → {0, 1}N , IV ∈ {0, 1}N be an MD5-like compression
function consisting of I reversible steps and a feed-forward. Let S be a set of
attack classes s = (δB, i, δWSi) and Us a set of unavoidable conditions for each
s ∈ S.
The algorithm below returns True when a near-collision attack was detected
and False otherwise.
Given padded message P = P1|| . . . ||Pn consisting of n blocks Pj ∈ {0, 1}M do:
1. Let CV0 = IV and do the following for j = 1, . . . , n:
(a) Evaluate CVj = H(CVj−1, Pj) and store intermediate working states WSi
after each step i = 0, . . . , I − 1 of H.
(b) For each s = (δB, i, δWSi) ∈ S do:
i. If u(CVj−1, Pj) = false for some u ∈ Us then skip steps ii.–vi.
ii. Determine P ′j = Pj + δB, WS
′
i = WSi + δWSi
iii. Compute steps i, i− 1, . . . , 0 of H backwards to determine CV ′j−1
iv. Compute steps i+ 1, . . . , I − 1 forwards to determine WS′I−1
v. Determine CV ′j from CV
′
j−1 and WS
′
I−1 (Davies-Meyer feed-forward)
vi. If CV ′j = CVj return True
2. Return False
Definition 2 (Unavoidable condition) For N,M ∈ N+, let H : {0, 1}N ×
{0, 1}M → {0, 1}N be a compression function and C be an attack class against H.
Let u : {0, 1}N×{0, 1}M → {false, true} be a non-trivial predicate over compres-
sion function inputs. Then u is called an unavoidable condition for attack class
C if and only if for all A ∈ C and for all possible outputs (CV1, B1, CV2, B2)← A
it holds that u(CV1, B1) = true and u(CV2, B2) = true.
3.2 Speeding up collision detection
Let S be a set of attack classes. For each attack class C ∈ S let sC = (δB, i, δWSi)
be the associated message block difference, step i and difference for the inter-
mediate state after step i as given in [22]. Also, let UC be a set of unavoidable
conditions for each C ∈ S.
For each compression function evaluation during the hashing of a given mes-
sage, collision detection will perform a recompression for every attack class C ∈ S.
Such a recompression is rather costly as it results in that the overall cost of col-
lision detection is a factor |S| more than only computing the hash.
If for compression function input (CV,B) and for a given attack class C
at least one unavoidable condition u ∈ UC is not satisfied then by definition
(CV,B) cannot be output by any attack A ∈ C (i.e., (CV1, B1) = (CV,B) or
(CV2, B2) = (CV,B) as in Thm. 1). As an attack from C has been ruled out, a
recompression for C is unnecessary and can be skipped. Alg. 1 is the improved
collision detection that uses unavoidable conditions as preconditions before a
performing a recompression. If the unavoidable conditions can be evaluated very
quickly in comparison to the recompression, e.g., comparing whether two bits are
equal/unequal in the internal state of the compression function, then a significant
speed improvement can be achieved.
4 Application to SHA-1
4.1 Notation
SHA-1 is defined using 32-bit words X = (xi)
31
i=0 ∈ {0, 1}32 that are identified
with elements X =
∑31
i=0 xi2
i of Z/232Z (for addition and subtraction). A binary
signed digit representation (BSDR) for X ∈ Z/232Z is a sequence Z = (zi)31i=0 ∈
{−1, 0, 1}32 for which X = ∑31i=0 zi2i. We use the following notation: Z[i] = zi,
RL(Z, n) and RR(Z, n) (cyclic left and right rotation), w(Z) (Hamming weight),
σ(Z) = X =
∑31
i=0 ki2
i ∈ Z/232Z.
In collision attacks we consider two related messages M and M ′. For any
variable X related to the SHA-1 calculation of M , we use X ′ to denote the
corresponding variable for M ′. Furthermore, for such a ‘matched’ variable X ∈
Z/232Z we define δX = X ′ −X and ∆X = (X ′[i]−X[i])31i=0.
4.2 SHA-1’s compression function
The input for SHA-1’s Compress consists of an intermediate hash value CVin =
(a, b, c, d, e) of five 32-bit words and a 512-bit message block B. The 512-bit
message block B is partitioned into 16 consecutive 32-bit strings which are in-
terpreted as 32-bit words W0, W1, . . . ,W15 (using big-endian), and expanded to
W0, . . . ,W79 as follows:
Wt = RL(Wt−3 ⊕Wt−8 ⊕Wt−14 ⊕Wt−16, 1),
for 16 ≤ t < 80. (1)
We describe SHA-1’s compression function Compress in an ‘unrolled’ version.
For each step t = 0, . . . , 79 it uses a working state consisting of five 32-bit words
Qt, Qt−1, Qt−2, Qt−3 and Qt−4 and calculates a new state word Qt+1. The
working state is initialized before the first step as:
(Q0, Q−1, Q−2,Q−3, Q−4)
= (a, b, RR(c, 30), RR(d, 30), RR(e, 30)).
For t = 0, 1, . . . , 79 in succession, Qt+1 is calculated as follows:
Ft = ft(Qt−1, RL(Qt−2, 30), RL(Qt−3, 30)),
Qt+1 = Ft +ACt +Wt +RL(Qt, 5) +RL(Qt−4, 30).
(2)
These 80 steps are grouped in 4 rounds of 20 steps each. Here, ACt is the
constant 5a82799916, 6ed9eba116, 8f1bbcdc16 or ca62c1d616 for the 1st, 2nd,
3rd and 4th round, respectively. The non-linear function ft(X,Y, Z) is defined
as (X ∧Y )⊕ (X ∧Z), X ⊕Y ⊕Z, (X ∧Y )∨ (Z ∧ (X ∨Y )) or X ⊕Y ⊕Z for
the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th round, respectively. Finally, the output intermediate
hash value CVout is determined as:
CVout = (a+Q80, b+Q79, c+RL(Q78, 30),
d+RL(Q77, 30), e+RL(Q76, 30)).
4.3 Local collisions and the disturbance vector
In 1998, Chabaud and Joux [3] constructed a collision attack on SHA-0, SHA-1’s
withdrawn predecessor, based on local collisions. A local collision over 6 steps
for SHA-0 and SHA-1 consists of a disturbance δQt+1 = 2
b created in some step
t by a message word bit difference δWt = 2
b. This disturbance is corrected over
the next five steps, so that after those five steps no differences occur in the five
working state words. They were able to interleave many of these local collisions
such that the message word differences (∆Wt)
79
t=0 conform to the message ex-
pansion (cf. Eq. 1). For more convenient analysis, they consider the disturbance
vector which is a non-zero vector (DVt)
79
t=0 conform to the message expansion
where every ‘1’-bit DVt[b] marks the start of a local collision based on the dis-
turbance δWt[b] = ±1. We denote by (DWt)79t=0 the message word bit differences
without sign (i.e., DWt = W
′
t ⊕Wt) for a disturbance vector (DVt)79t=0:
DWt :=
⊕
(i,r)∈R
RL(DVt−i, r),
where
R = {(0, 0), (1, 5), (2, 0), (3, 30), (4, 30), (5, 30)}.
Note that for each step one uses differences δWt instead of DWt. We say that
a message word difference δWt is compatible with DWt if there are coefficients
c0, . . . , c31 ∈ {−1, 1} such that δWt =
∑31
j=0 cj · DWt[j]. The set Wt of all
compatible message word differences given DWt is defined as:
Wt :=
{
σ(X)
∣∣∣ BSDR X,X[i]∈{−DWt[i],+DWt[i]}, i∈{0,...,31}} (3)
As for bit position 31 it holds that −231 ≡ 231 mod 232, only the signing of bits
0, . . . , 30 affect the resulting δWt. In fact for every δWt ∈ Wt it holds that the
coefficient ci ∈ {−1, 1} for every bit position i ∈ {0, . . . , 30} with DWt[i] = 1 is
uniquely determined.
4.4 Disturbance vector classes
Manuel [14] has classified previously found interesting disturbance vectors into
two classes. A disturbance vector from the first class denoted by I(K, b) is defined
by DVK = . . . = DVK+14 = 0 and DVK+15 = 2
b. Similarly, a disturbance vector
from the second class denoted by II(K, b) is defined by DVK+1 = DVK+3 =
RL(231, b) and DVK+15 = 2
b and DVK+i = 0 for i ∈ {0, 2, 4, 5, . . . , 14}. For both
classes, the remaining DV0, . . . , DVK−1 and DVK+16, . . . , DV79 are determined
through the (reverse) message expansion relation (Eq. 1).
4.5 Unavoidable conditions
The literature on collision attacks against SHA-1 (e.g., see [30, 20, 15, 10, 2, 16,
1, 33, 4, 32, 7, 14, 23]) consists entirely of attacks based on combinations of local
collisions as prescribed by a disturbance vector. This is a common property and
for a very compelling reason: it is the only known way to construct differential
paths with message word differences compatible with the message expansion
relation. Even then it seems that out of 2512 possible disturbance vectors there
are only a few tens of disturbance vectors suitable for feasible cryptanalytic
attacks.
In the first number of steps and the last few steps attacks can deviate from the
DV-prescribed local collisions without a significant impact in the overall attack
complexity. On the contrary, it is an important technique to use a specially
crafted so-called ’non-linear’ differential path for the first number of steps to
allow arbitrary chaining value differences to be used in combination with the
disturbance vector as introduced by Wang et al.[30]. Also, for the last few steps
there may be higher probability differential steps as shown in [23]. However,
deviating from DV-prescribed local collisions towards the middle becomes very
costly very quickly as the resulting avalanche of perturbations directly leads to
significant increases of the attack complexity. Hence, for the steps in the middle
it remains unavoidable to use the DV-prescribed local collisions, which has led
us to the following conjecture:
Conjecture 3 Over steps [35, 65) it is unavoidable to use the DV-prescribed
local collisions: deviating from the DV over these steps will result in an avalanche
that will significantly increase the attack complexity.
As published collision attacks only deviate from local collisions in the first 20
steps or the last 5 steps (75 up to 79) for reasons already mentioned, the current
state of art solidly supports our conjecture with a safe margin. In fact we have
considered taking a large range of steps in Thm. 3, however the increase in
number of unavoidable conditions only results in a slight performance increase.
In the end we opted for a larger safety margin instead of a slight performance
increase.
Based on our Thm. 3, we propose to protect against attack classes based on
disturbance vectors that use the prescribed local collisions over steps [35, 65).
This restriction allows us to determine unavoidable conditions over all non-zero
probability differential paths over steps 35 up to 65 that adhere to the distur-
bance vector. We propose to use unavoidable message bit relations that control
the signs of bits in the ∆Wt. These message bit relations are used in attacks to
ensure that, e.g., adjacent active bits collapse to a single bit difference, or that
two bits have opposing sign to cancel differences (the perturbation of each local
collision). Looking at SHA-1 attacks, these message bit relations are all of the
form Wi[a] ⊕Wj [b] = c or Wi[a] = c, hence this specific form of unavoidable
conditions can be checked very efficiently. But as noted before, one cannot sim-
ply use the necessary conditions of one attack, it is important to prove which of
those message bit relations are necessary for all feasible attacks. We will refer to
such unavoidable message bit relations as unavoidable bit conditions or UBC s.
The method we can use to determine the UBCs for each disturbance vector is
described below.
4.6 Using Joint-Local Collision Analysis
Choose any disturbance vector that may lead to a feasible collision attack. To
determine the UBCs for this disturbance vector, we will need to work with the
set of all possible DV-based differential paths over steps [35, 65). Any differential
path uses fixed differences for each expanded message word, these directly imply
values for some bits Wt[i]. The set of these bit positions Wt[i] is independent of
the differential path and is pre-determined by the DV. We map each differential
path to a vector containing the values for these bit positions Wt[i]. Then we can
look at the smallest affine vector space that encompasses all these vectors. This
affine vector space can be represented by a system of linear equations over those
message bits, which will directly give the desired unavoidable bit conditions. By
construction it follows that any solution to any possible differential path based
on this DV satisfies these unavoidable bit conditions. Therefore if an expanded
message does not satisfy all UBCs then this message cannot be a solution for
any possible differential path over steps [35, 65) based on this DV.
To efficiently compute UBCs we will use techniques introduced in [23] that
allow efficient computations on large classes of differential paths that are other-
wise not possible. We will present our method at a higher level using notation
taken from [23]: Let Qt be the set of all allowed state differences ∆Qt given
(DVi)
79
i=0:
Qt :=
{
BSDR Y
∣∣∣ σ(Y )=σ(Z),Z[i]∈{−DVt−1[i],DVt−1[i]}, i=0,...,31} .
A differential path P over steps t ∈ [35, 65) is given as
P = ((∆Qt)64+1t=35−4, (∆Ft)64t=35, (δWt)64t=35),
with correct differential steps for t ∈ [35, 65):
σ(∆Qt+1) = σ(RL(∆Qt, 5))+σ(RL(∆Qt−4, 30))
+ σ(∆Ft) + δWt.
(4)
The success probability Pr[P] of a differential path P is defined as the probability
that the given path P holds exactly for uniformly-randomly chosen Q̂35−4, . . . , Q̂35
and Ŵ35, . . . , Ŵ64 and where the other variables are computed as defined in
SHA-1’s compression function. This can be efficiently computed (cf. [23]).
The set of all possible DV-based differential paths over steps [35, 65) that we
will actually use to determine unavoidable bit conditions is defined as:
D[35,65) :=
{P̂ ∣∣ ∆Q̂i ∈ Qi, δŴj ∈ Wj , Pr[P̂] > 0}
Let P ∈ D[35,65) and let δW35, . . . , δW64 be its message word differences. Let
t ∈ [35, 65) and let It ⊆ {0, . . . , 30} be the set of bit positions 0 ≤ i ≤ 30 such
that DWt[i] = 1. As δWt ∈ Wt, we have that δWt =
∑31
i=0 ci · DWt[i] with
c0, . . . , c31 ∈ −1, 1 (Eq. 3). We use the fact that the coefficients ci with i ∈ It
are uniquely determined. This implies values for the bits Wt[i] with i ∈ It as:
– if ci = 1 then ∆Wt[i] = 1 ·DWt = 1
thus Wt[i] = 0 and W
′
t [i] = 1;
– if ci = −1 then ∆Wt[i] = −1 ·DWt = −1
thus Wt[i] = 1 and W
′
t [i] = 0;
Hence, given P ∈ D[35,65) for t ∈ [35, 65) and i ∈ It the value of Wt[i] is known.
Let X = ((t, i) | t ∈ [35, 65) ∧ i ∈ It) be a vector of all (t, i) for which the value
of Wt[i] is known given P ∈ D[35,65) and let R = |X| be the length of X. Then
we can define a mapping that maps differential paths to a vector over F2 of the
message bits Wt[i] that are known:
µ : D[35,65) → FR2 : P 7→ (Wt[i]|(t, i) = X[r])Rr=1
And we can look at the smallest affine vector space V that encapsulates the image
µ(D[35,65)) of D[35,65). Although V is uniquely determined, its representation
V = o+ < v1, . . . , vn > with an origin o and generating vectors v1, . . . , vn is not
unique. Let Po ∈ D[35,65) be a fixed differential path, then we compute V as:
o = µ(Po), ∀P ∈ D[35,65) : vP = µ(P)− o.
Using linear algebra we can determine an equivalent description of V as a system
of equations over bits Wt[i] with (t, i) ∈ X. This system of linear equations can
be further manipulated using linear operations, and thus can be viewed as a
linear space itself. So we use its ’row reduced form’ which results entirely in
equations over 2 message bits of the form Wi[a]⊕Wj [b] = c.
For our improved SHA-1 collision detection implementation we have selected
the 32 disturbance vectors with lowest estimated cost as in [23]. This is more
than the 14 disturbance vectors intially suggested in [22], but using UBCs we
could simply add protection against more DVs with very low extra cost. We
ended up at 32 DVs as our UBC checking algorithm uses a 32-bit integer to hold
a mask where each bit is associated with a DV and represents whether the UBCs
of that DV are all fulfilled. The 32 disturbance vectors with number of UBCs in
parentheses are given in Tbl. 1. The full listing of UBCs for these DVs is given
in Sect. A.
4.7 Exploiting overlapping conditions between DVs
As disturbance vectors within each type I or II are all shifted and rotated ver-
sions of each other, disturbance vectors may have local collisions at the same
positions and therefore may have some overlap in unavoidable bit conditions. In
this section we try to maximize the number of UBCs shared between DVs by
Table 1. SHA-1 DV selection and number of UBCs
I(43,0) (11 UBCs) I(44,0) (12 UBCs) I(45,0) (12 UBCs) I(46,0) (11 UBCs)
I(46,2) (7 UBCs) I(47,0) (12 UBCs) I(47,2) (7 UBCs) I(48,0) (14 UBCs)
I(48,2) (7 UBCs) I(49,0) (13 UBCs) I(49,2) (8 UBCs) I(50,0) (14 UBCs)
I(50,2) (8 UBCs) I(51,0) (15 UBCs) I(51,2) (10 UBCs) I(52,0) (14 UBCs)
II(45,0) (11 UBCs) II(46,0) (11 UBCs) II(46,2) (7 UBCs) II(47,0) (14 UBCs)
II(48,0) (15 UBCs) II(49,0) (14 UBCs) II(49,2) (9 UBCs) II(50,0) (14 UBCs)
II(50,2) (9 UBCs) II(51,0) (14 UBCs) II(51,2) (9 UBCs) II(52,0) (15 UBCs)
II(53,0) (14 UBCs) II(54,0) (14 UBCs) II(55,0) (14 UBCs) II(56,0) (14 UBCs)
further manipulating the set of UBCs per DV. As each UBC is a linear equa-
tion, the set of UBCs per DV can be further manipulated for our purposes using
simple linear operation.
In the previous section we analyzed 32 disturbance vectors and found 7 to 15
UBCs per DV with a total of 373 UBCs. The UBCs for each DV were generated
in a ‘row-reduced form’ and this already leads to a significant overlap of UBCs:
among the total of 373 UBCs there are only 263 distinct UBCs. E.g., UBC
W39[4] ⊕W42[29] = 0 is shared among DVs I(45,0), I(49,0) and II(48,0). Using
the procedure below we are able to reduce the number of distinct UBCs to 156.
Note that for each DV the new set of UBCs remains equivalent to the original
set of UBCs.
To minimize the overall amount of distinct UBCs we use a greedy selection
algorithm to rebuild the set of UBCs per DV. Starting at an empty set of UBCs
for each DV, our greedy algorithm in each step selects a new distinct UBC that
is shared between as many DVs as possible and adds it to set of UBCs for the
corresponding DVs. More specifically, for each DV it first generates a list of
candidate UBCs by taking all linear combinations of the original set of UBCs
and removes all candidates that are a linear combination of the current set of
UBCs and thus that are already covered so far. Then it selects all UBCs that
maximize the number of DVs it belongs to but is not covered so far. It rates each
of those UBCs first based on weight (minimal weight prefered), second based on
number of active bit positions (fewer bit positions prefered) and finally on the
gap j − i between the first Wi and the last Wj in the UBC. It selects the best
rated UBC and adds that to UBC sets of the DVs it belongs to but is not covered
so far. Finally, for each DV it will output a new set of UBCs that is equivalent
to the original set of UBCs, but for which there are much fewer distinct UBCs
over all DVs.
The output of improved sets of UBCs of our greedy selection algorithm for
the 32 DVs and original 373 UBCs found in the previous section can be found
in Sect. A. Using this approach we have further reduced the number of unique
UBCs from 263 to 156, where each new UBC belongs up to 7 DVs.
In Sect. 5.1 we further comment on the implementation of this greedy al-
gorithm that immediately outputs optimized C code for verifying UBCs for all
32 DVs simultaneously. This optimized C code is verified against a straightfor-
ward simple implementation using the original sets of 373 UBCs as described in
Sect. 5.2.
5 Implementation
This section describes the implementation of the UBC check in the SHA-1 Col-
lision detection library. Our library and the tools used to create it have been
made publicly available at GitHub5. This release contains the collision detec-
tion library that can be used in other software in the directory ’lib’, the ‘src’
directory contains a modified sha1sum command line tool that uses the library.
Both can be built by calling ‘make’ in the parent directory, additionally a special
version ‘sha1dcsum partialcoll’ is also included that specifically detects example
collisions against reduced-round SHA-1 (as no full round SHA-1 collisions have
been found yet.) Furthermore, in the directory ‘tools’ we provide the following:
– the original listing of UBCs per DV (directory ‘data/3565’);
– an example partial collision for SHA-1 (file ‘test/sha1 reducedsha coll.bin’);
– the greedy selection algorithm from Sect. 4.7 that optimizes the UBC sets
and outputs optimized code (directory ‘parse bitrel’), see Sect. 5.1;
– a program that verifies the optimized C code with optimized UBC sets
against manually-verifiable C code (directory ‘ubc check test’), see Sect. 5.2;
In Sect. 6 we discuss expected and measured performance of our improved SHA-1
collision detection.
5.1 Parse Bit Relations
This section describes the parse_bitrel program that implements the greedy
selection algorithm described in Sect. 4.7 and generates source code for an opti-
mized UBC check.
The greedy algorithm using the input UBC sets in directory ‘data/3565’
outputs improved UBC-sets for the DVs that have significant overlap. Another
equivalent perspective is looking at the unique UBCs and the set of DVs each
unique UBC belongs to, Sect. A lists the improved UBCs in this manner. The
program parse bitrel uses this perspective to generate optimized source code
for a function ubc_check which given an expanded message will return a mask
of which DVs had all their UBCs satisfied.
As noted in Sect. 4.6 we have selected 32 disturbance vectors. Thus keeping
track for which disturbance vectors a recompression is necessary conveniently
fits in a 32 bit integer mask C. Each bit position in C will be associated with a
particular DV T(k, b), where T represents the type I or II, and we have a named
constant of the form DV_T_K_B_bit that will have only that bit set. Initially C
will have all bits set and for each UBC that is not satisfied we will set bits to 0
at the bit positions of the DVs the UBC belongs to.
5 https://github.com/cr-marcstevens/sha1collisiondetection,
https://github.com/cr-marcstevens/sha1collisiondetection-tools.
The UBCs for SHA-1 are of the form Wi[a] ⊕ Wj [b] = c as described in
Sect. 4.6. The outcome of this condition is translated into a mask with all bits
set or all bits cleared using the following C-code:
M=0-(((W[i]>>a)^(W[j]>>b))&1) if c = 1
M=(((W[i]>>a)^(W[j]>>b))&1)-1 if c = 0
Note that in both of these cases, if UBC is satisfied then M results in a value
with all bits set (−1 in 2’s complement) and 0 otherwise.
Say the UBC belongs to multiple disturbance vectors DV_T1_K1_B1_bit,
DV_T2_K2_B2_bit, . . ., DV_TN_KN_BN_bit, then a mask is formed that has all
other bits belonging to other DVs set to 0. This mask will be OR’ed into the
mask M above to force bits to the value 1 for all bit positions associated with
DVs not belonging to this unique UBC:
M | ~(DV_T1_K1_B1_bit | DV_T2_K2_B2_bit | ...
| DV_TN_KN_BN_bit).
In effect, only the bit positions for DVs the unique UBC belongs to can be 0
which they will be if and only if the unique UBC is not satisfied. Hence, this last
mask will be AND’ed into the variable C to conditionally clear the bits associated
with these DVs if the UBC is not satisfied. For example, the following clause is
one of the clauses generated by the parse_bitrel:
C &= ((((W[46]>>4)^(W[49]>>29))&1)-1) |
~( DV_I_46_0_bit | DV_I_48_0_bit | DV_I_50_0_bit |
DV_I_52_0_bit | DV_II_50_0_bit | DV_II_55_0_bit );
The ubc_check function thus consists of initializing the variable C and state-
ments for each unique UBC to update C as described above. The parse bitrel
program combines these clauses into a bit-wise AND of all the individual state-
ments and generates the ubc check function. The above example works for all
cases. However, we can produce slightly better statements with fewer operations
in certain cases which are omitted here, but can be found in the public source
code.
5.2 UBCCheckTest: Correctness testing
This section describes the program ubc check test for correctness testing. The
above program parse bitrel will output optimized C-code for ubc check that
will verify all UBCs and output a mask whose bits mark whether a recompres-
sion for a particular DV is needed. For testing purposes one would like to have
many test cases to run it on, however there are no SHA-1 example collisions
at all. Hence, great care must be taken to ensure code correctness of the colli-
sion detection library. For this purpose we let parse_bitrel also output C-code
for a function ubc_check_verify that will be equivalent to ubc_check but will
be based on the original non-improved UBC-sets and use straightforward code
that can be manually verified for correctness. After manual verification we know
ubc_check_verify to be correct.
To ensure that ubc_check is correct we test its functional equivalence to the
correct ubc_check_verify. As each individual UBC statement depends on only
2 expanded message bits Wi[a] and Wi[b], if an error exists it will trigger with
probability at least 0.25 for random values. Unfortunately, such an error may be
masked by other UBCs not being satisfied and forcing the bit positions in C with
possible errors to 0 anyway. To ensure any error will reveal itself, we feed 224
random inputs to both ubc_check and ubc_check_verify and verify whether
their outputs are identical. As the highest number of UBCs of a DV is 15, if an
error is located in the code of one of these UBCs we can still expect that out of
the 224 samples we will have approximately 210 cases where all other UBCs for
this DV are satisfied. In these cases the output bit for this DV of ubc check and
ubc check verify equals the output for the target UBC and the error will be
exposed with probability at least 0.25 for each of these 210 cases. The probability
that an error with probability at least 0.25 will not occur in 210 random inputs
is at most 0.751024 ≈ 2−425. This, as well as a few other basic tests, ensures
that our greedy selection algorithm for improved UBC-sets and the produced
optimized C-code ubc_check contains no errors.
6 Performance
In this section we discuss the expected performance increase and we compare
some measured speeds. We have compiled and tested the code on different com-
piler and processor technologies. The performance of the implementation was
compiled with both GCC (gcc) and the Microsoft Visual Studio C++ compiler
(msvc), when compiled with gcc the code was run on Ubuntu 14.04 and when
compiled with msvc the code was run on windows 8.1. For gcc and msvc both
x86-32 and x86-64, the code was run on an Intel Xeon L5520 running at 2.26GHz.
For gcc arm, the code was run on a Raspberry Pi 2 running Raspbian with a
ARM Cortex-A7 running at 900Mhz.
The performance numbers below vary a bit between different compiler and
processor technologies due to different available processor instructions and differ-
ent compiler optimizations. Such variances for a given platform could be elim-
inated using assembly code, however such code is very hard to maintain and
therefore not considerated for our project. Due to these variances the shown
results should be taken as indicative speed improvements for other compilers
and/or compiler optimization flags and/or processors.
Using UBCs, we will only do a recompress for a given DV if all its UBCs are
satisfied. Let S be the set of DVs and Udv be the set of UBCs for dv ∈ S. Then
the probability pdv that a random message block satisfies all UBCs associated
with dv ∈ S is pdv = 2−|Udv|. Hence, the expected cost of the recompressions for
dv ∈ S is pdv × n× SHA1Compress, where n is the number of message blocks for
a given message, or equivalently pdv × SHA-1.
The expected total cost of all recompressions for a given message of n message
blocks is therefore
(∑
dv∈S pdv
)×SHA-1. For the 32 selected disturbance vectors
Table 2. Comparison of the performance of SHA-1’s compression function and our
ubc check function. Units given in number of single message block operations per
second. ubc check takes 72% to 101% of the time of SHA1Compress.
SHA1Compress ubc_check
gcc x86-64 4.217e06 5.451e06 (0.77×)
msvc x86-64 3.624e06 4.689e06 (0.77×)
msvc x86-32 3.099e06 4.326e06 (0.72×)
gcc arm 5.504e05 5.448e05 (1.01×)
Table 3. Performance numbers for message block computations of the SHA-1 Message
Digest algorithm, units given in number of 2KiB messages hashed per second. Collision
detection using UBCs is 1.59 to 1.96 times slower than SHA-1, however without using
UBCs collision detection is 21.68 to 36.36 times slower than SHA-1.
SHA-1 SHA-1 DC UBC Check SHA-1 DC no UBC Check
gcc x86-64 1.095e05 5.574e04 (1.96×) 3.567e03 (30.69×)
msvc x86-64 1.035e05 6.515e04 (1.59×) 2.848e03 (36.35×)
msvc x86-32 8.500e04 4.346e04 (1.96×) 2.642e03 (32.17×)
gcc arm 1.368e04 7.054e03 (1.94×) 6.311e02 (21.68×)
given in Tbl. 1 together with their number of UBCs, we found that
∑
dv∈S pdv ≈
0.0495.
Therefore using UBCs we have reduced the cost of recompressions from 32×
SHA-1 to ≈ 0.0495× SHA-1, a speed improvement of a factor of about 646. Also,
this implies that on average we can expect to do one recompression about every
20.2 message blocks. However, the total cost of collision detection includes the
cost of SHA-1 as well as the cost of verifying the UBCs.
We have measured the cost of ubc_check in comparison to SHA1Compress in
function calls per second in Tbl. 2. These figures were determined by measuring
the time of 226 function calls on already prepared random inputs. The relative
performance ratio ubc check/ SHA1Compress is given in parentheses. We have
measured that ubc check takes about 72% to 101% of the time of SHA1Compress
depending on the platform. Let denote this ratio as u then we can expect that the
total cost of collision detection using UBCs is approximately (1 + u+ 0.0495)×
SHA-1. Hence, this leads to an estimated cost factor of about 1.77 to 2.06 of
collision detection relative to the original SHA-1. Note that we expect the actual
figures to be slightly lower as both the cost of the recompressions and the cost
of ubc check are expressed relatively to SHA1Compress and not to SHA-1 which
actually includes some more overhead. This shows that the UBC check almost
completely eliminates the amount of time doing full disturbance vector checks
and the performance loss is purely spent by time in the ubc check function itself.
Thus using UBCs we expect collision detection to be possible in around double
the time it takes to compute a single hash digest. Overall the relative timings of
ubc check shows that we can expect drastic speedups from using unavoidable
conditions.
The analysis of the internal operations of the SHA-1 hash and collision de-
tection ignores a great deal of overhead that the algorithm may incur. So it is
necessary to do a more detailed performance analysis of the full collision detec-
tion algorithm. The scaling of this algorithm does not depend on the length of
the input varying. So a reference timing for hashing random 2 kilobyte messages
was used. This number was chosen because it is representative of the order of
magnitude of bytes that must be hashed while verifying a single RSA certifi-
cate. Tbl. 3 shows the overall function calls per second count for random 2KiB
messages. We timed the original SHA-1 without collision detection, SHA-1 with
collision detection with the UBC optimizations, and finally SHA-1 with collision
detection but without using UBCs. The presented timings were determined by
running the measured function on an already prepared random input in a loop
with 512 iterations, and averaging these timings for 128 different random inputs.
Note that these are preliminary performance numbers and have limited precision
and more accurate numbers will be provided in later drafts of this paper.
As in the previous table the relative performance to SHA-1 is given in paren-
theses. For example, when compiled with gcc x86-64 the SHA-1 digest algorithm
with hash collision detection but without the UBC check optimizations takes
over 30 times the amount of time it takes to run the original digest algorithm.
While adding the UBC check allows the collision detection code to run in just
under double the time. This table shows that while adding the straight forward
collision detection code increases the time of a SHA-1 computation by around
30 times, using the UBC check optimizations allows a SHA-1 computation with
collision detection to be run in just over double the time.
7 Future directions
From our results it is clear unavoidable conditions can be used for a signifi-
cant speed up for collision detection resulting in only a small performance loss
compared to the performance of the original cryptographic primitive SHA-1.
We intend to supply additional reference code to ease use of our SHA-1
collision detection library in all application that use OpenSSL [27] in future work.
This should make collision detection significantly easier to apply in applications
even for developers with limited experience with OpenSSL and cryptographic
libraries.
Another future research direction is how to determine unavoidable conditions
for MD5. MD5 is significantly weaker than SHA-1 and there are 223 known
attack classes that are based on a number of different approaches to construct a
high probability differential path over the most important steps that contribute
to the complexity. It is thus significantly more challenging to find UBCs for these
classes and will require a more close study of the different main approaches.
Nevertheless, as MD5 collision detection is 224 times slower than MD5, there is
ample room and demand for speed improvements.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a significant performance improvement for colli-
sion detection, which is very timely due to the recently announced first collision
for SHA-1. We have formally treated a new concept of unavoidable conditions
that the output of any feasible attack in an attack class must satisfy. Further-
more, based on a conjecture solidly supported by the current state of the art, we
have shown how we can determine unavoidable bit conditions (UBC) for SHA-1
and how to maximize the overlap between the UBC sets of different DVs. We
have implemented the improved SHA-1 collision detection using such unavoid-
able conditions and which is about 16 times faster than without our unavoidable
condition improvements. We have measured that overall our implementation of
SHA-1 with collision detection is only a factor 1.96 slower on average than the
original SHA-1.
That collisions attacks are a realistic and significant threat is very clear given
the rogue Certification Authority publication [26] and the exposed Windows
Update signature forgery in the supermalware Flame [22]. This shows that nation
states have the resources to carry out such attacks and exploit them in the real
world. Furthermore SHA-1-based signatures are still used at large and are also
supported for verification almost ubiquitously. More protection against signature
forgeries is greatly warranted and our improved SHA-1 collision detection enables
protection against digital signature forgeries at a very low cost.
As SHA-1 is practically broken, yet SHA-1-based signatures are still used
at large and are also widely supported (at least for verification), our improved
SHA-1 collision detection enables protection against digital signature forgeries
at a very low cost.
References
[1] Christophe De Cannie`re, Florian Mendel, and Christian Rechberger, Collisions
for 70-Step SHA-1: On the Full Cost of Collision Search, Selected Areas in Cryp-
tography (Carlisle M. Adams, Ali Miri, and Michael J. Wiener, eds.), Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4876, Springer, 2007, pp. 56–73.
[2] Christophe De Cannie`re and Christian Rechberger, Finding SHA-1 Characteris-
tics: General Results and Applications, ASIACRYPT (Xuejia Lai and Kefei Chen,
eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4284, Springer, 2006, pp. 1–20.
[3] Florent Chabaud and Antoine Joux, Differential Collisions in SHA-0 , CRYPTO
(Hugo Krawczyk, ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1462, Springer,
1998, pp. 56–71.
[4] Martin Cochran, Notes on the Wang et al. 263 SHA-1 Differential Path, Cryptol-
ogy ePrint Archive, Report 2007/474, 2007.
[5] Ivan Damg˚ard, A Design Principle for Hash Functions, CRYPTO (Gilles Bras-
sard, ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 435, Springer, 1989, pp. 416–
427.
[6] Max Fillinger and Marc Stevens, Reverse-Engineering of the Cryptanalytic At-
tack Used in the Flame Super-Malware, ASIACRYPT (Tetsu Iwata and Jung Hee
Cheon, eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9453, Springer, 2015,
pp. 586–611.
[7] E.A. Grechnikov, Collisions for 72-step and 73-step SHA-1: Improvements in the
Method of Characteristics, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2010/413, 2010.
[8] E.A. Grechnikov and A.V. Adinetz, Collision for 75-step SHA-1: Intensive Par-
allelization with GPU, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2011/641, 2011, http:
//eprint.iacr.org/2011/641.
[9] InfoWorld, Oracle to Java devs: Stop signing JAR files with MD5 , January 2017.
[10] Charanjit S. Jutla and Anindya C. Patthak, A Matching Lower Bound on the
Minimum Weight of SHA-1 Expansion Code, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report
2005/266, 2005.
[11] Pierre Karpman, Thomas Peyrin, and Marc Stevens, Practical Free-Start Collision
Attacks on 76-step SHA-1 , CRYPTO (Rosario Gennaro and Matthew Robshaw,
eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9215, Springer, 2015, pp. 623–642.
[12] CrySyS Lab, sKyWIper (a.k.a. Flame a.k.a. Flamer): A complex malware for tar-
geted attacks, Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security, Budapest Uni-
versity of Technology and Economics, May 31, 2012.
[13] Kaspersky Lab, The Flame: Questions and Answers, Securelist blog, May 28,
2012.
[14] Ste´phane Manuel, Classification and generation of disturbance vectors for collision
attacks against SHA-1 , Des. Codes Cryptography 59 (2011), no. 1-3, 247–263.
[15] Krystian Matusiewicz and Josef Pieprzyk, Finding Good Differential Patterns for
Attacks on SHA-1 , WCC (Øyvind Ytrehus, ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 3969, Springer, 2005, pp. 164–177.
[16] Florian Mendel, Norbert Pramstaller, Christian Rechberger, and Vincent Rijmen,
The Impact of Carries on the Complexity of Collision Attacks on SHA-1 , FSE
(Matthew J. B. Robshaw, ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4047,
Springer, 2006, pp. 278–292.
[17] Ralph C. Merkle, One Way Hash Functions and DES , CRYPTO (Gilles Brassard,
ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 435, Springer, 1989, pp. 428–446.
[18] National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1: Secure
Hash Standard, 1995.
[19] The Washington Post, U.S., Israel developed Flame computer virus to slow Iranian
nuclear efforts, officials say , Ellen Nakashima, Greg Miller and Julie Tate, June
2012.
[20] Norbert Pramstaller, Christian Rechberger, and Vincent Rijmen, Exploiting Cod-
ing Theory for Collision Attacks on SHA-1 , IMA Int. Conf. (Nigel P. Smart, ed.),
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3796, Springer, 2005, pp. 78–95.
[21] Amazon Web Services, Amazon EC2 – Virtual Server Hosting , aws.amazon.com,
Retrieved Jan. 2016.
[22] Marc Stevens, Counter-Cryptanalysis, CRYPTO (Ran Canetti and Juan A.
Garay, eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8042-I, Springer, 2013,
pp. 129–146.
[23] Marc Stevens, New Collision Attacks on SHA-1 Based on Optimal Joint Local-
Collision Analysis, EUROCRYPT (Thomas Johansson and Phong Q. Nguyen,
eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7881, Springer, 2013, pp. 245–261.
[24] Marc Stevens, Pierre Karpman, and Thomas Peyrin, Freestart Collision for Full
SHA-1 , EUROCRYPT (Marc Fischlin and Jean-Se´bastien Coron, eds.), Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9665, Springer, 2016, pp. 459–483.
[25] Marc Stevens, Arjen K. Lenstra, and Benne de Weger, Chosen-Prefix Collisions
for MD5 and Colliding X.509 Certificates for Different Identities, EUROCRYPT
(Moni Naor, ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4515, Springer, 2007,
pp. 1–22.
[26] Marc Stevens, Alexander Sotirov, Jacob Appelbaum, Arjen K. Lenstra, David
Molnar, Dag Arne Osvik, and Benne de Weger, Short Chosen-Prefix Collisions
for MD5 and the Creation of a Rogue CA Certificate, CRYPTO (Shai Halevi,
ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5677, Springer, 2009, pp. 55–69.
[27] The OpenSSL Project, OpenSSL: The Open Source toolkit for SSL/TLS , 1998,
www.openssl.org.
[28] ThreadPost, SHA-1 end times have arrived , January 2017.
[29] Xiaoyun Wang, Dengguo Feng, Xuejia Lai, and Hongbo Yu, Collisions for Hash
Functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD , Cryptology ePrint Archive,
Report 2004/199, 2004.
[30] Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun Lisa Yin, and Hongbo Yu, Finding Collisions in the Full
SHA-1 , CRYPTO (Victor Shoup, ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol.
3621, Springer, 2005, pp. 17–36.
[31] Xiaoyun Wang and Hongbo Yu, How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions,
EUROCRYPT (Ronald Cramer, ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol.
3494, Springer, 2005, pp. 19–35.
[32] Jun Yajima, Terutoshi Iwasaki, Yusuke Naito, Yu Sasaki, Takeshi Shimoyama,
Noboru Kunihiro, and Kazuo Ohta, A strict evaluation method on the number of
conditions for the SHA-1 collision search, ASIACCS (Masayuki Abe and Virgil D.
Gligor, eds.), ACM, 2008, pp. 10–20.
[33] Jun Yajima, Yu Sasaki, Yusuke Naito, Terutoshi Iwasaki, Takeshi Shimoyama,
Noboru Kunihiro, and Kazuo Ohta, A New Strategy for Finding a Differential
Path of SHA-1 , ACISP (Josef Pieprzyk, Hossein Ghodosi, and Ed Dawson, eds.),
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4586, Springer, 2007, pp. 45–58.
A Unavoidable bit conditions
The tables below list the UBCs we have found in Sect. 4.6 and after processing
to exploit their overlap as in Sect. 4.7. Instead of listing DVs with their UBCs,
we list the UBCs together with the list of DVs they belong to.
Table 4: Overlapping unavoidable bit conditions
UBC List of DVs the UBC belongs to
W44[29]⊕W45[29] = 0 I(48,0) I(51,0) I(52,0) II(45,0) II(46,0) II(50,0) II(51,0)
W49[29]⊕W50[29] = 0 I(46,0) II(45,0) II(50,0) II(51,0) II(55,0) II(56,0)
W48[29]⊕W49[29] = 0 I(45,0) I(52,0) II(49,0) II(50,0) II(54,0) II(55,0)
W47[29]⊕W48[29] = 0 I(44,0) I(51,0) II(48,0) II(49,0) II(53,0) II(54,0)
W46[29]⊕W47[29] = 0 I(43,0) I(50,0) II(47,0) II(48,0) II(52,0) II(53,0)
W45[29]⊕W46[29] = 0 I(49,0) I(52,0) II(46,0) II(47,0) II(51,0) II(52,0)
W43[29]⊕W44[29] = 0 I(47,0) I(50,0) I(51,0) II(45,0) II(49,0) II(50,0)
W40[29]⊕W41[29] = 0 I(44,0) I(47,0) I(48,0) II(46,0) II(47,0) II(56,0)
W47[4]⊕W50[29] = 0 I(47,0) I(49,0) I(51,0) II(45,0) II(51,0) II(56,0)
W46[4]⊕W49[29] = 0 I(46,0) I(48,0) I(50,0) I(52,0) II(50,0) II(55,0)
W45[4]⊕W48[29] = 0 I(45,0) I(47,0) I(49,0) I(51,0) II(49,0) II(54,0)
W44[4]⊕W47[29] = 0 I(44,0) I(46,0) I(48,0) I(50,0) II(48,0) II(53,0)
W43[4]⊕W46[29] = 0 I(43,0) I(45,0) I(47,0) I(49,0) II(47,0) II(52,0)
W42[4]⊕W45[29] = 0 I(44,0) I(46,0) I(48,0) I(52,0) II(46,0) II(51,0)
W41[4]⊕W44[29] = 0 I(43,0) I(45,0) I(47,0) I(51,0) II(45,0) II(50,0)
W54[29]⊕W55[29] = 0 I(51,0) II(47,0) II(50,0) II(55,0) II(56,0)
W53[29]⊕W54[29] = 0 I(50,0) II(46,0) II(49,0) II(54,0) II(55,0)
W52[29]⊕W53[29] = 0 I(49,0) II(45,0) II(48,0) II(53,0) II(54,0)
W50[29]⊕W51[29] = 0 I(47,0) II(46,0) II(51,0) II(52,0) II(56,0)
W42[29]⊕W43[29] = 0 I(46,0) I(49,0) I(50,0) II(48,0) II(49,0)
W41[29]⊕W42[29] = 0 I(45,0) I(48,0) I(49,0) II(47,0) II(48,0)
W50[4]⊕W53[29] = 0 I(50,0) I(52,0) II(46,0) II(48,0) II(54,0)
W49[4]⊕W52[29] = 0 I(49,0) I(51,0) II(45,0) II(47,0) II(53,0)
W48[4]⊕W51[29] = 0 I(48,0) I(50,0) I(52,0) II(46,0) II(52,0)
W40[4]⊕W43[29] = 0 I(44,0) I(46,0) I(50,0) II(49,0) II(56,0)
W39[4]⊕W42[29] = 0 I(43,0) I(45,0) I(49,0) II(48,0) II(55,0)
W38[4]⊕W41[29] = 0 I(44,0) I(48,0) II(47,0) II(54,0) II(56,0)
W37[4]⊕W40[29] = 0 I(43,0) I(47,0) II(46,0) II(53,0) II(55,0)
W55[29]⊕W56[29] = 0 I(52,0) II(48,0) II(51,0) II(56,0)
W51[29]⊕W52[29] = 0 I(48,0) II(47,0) II(52,0) II(53,0)
W52[4]⊕W55[29] = 0 I(52,0) II(48,0) II(50,0) II(56,0)
W51[4]⊕W54[29] = 0 I(51,0) II(47,0) II(49,0) II(55,0)
W36[4]⊕W40[29] = 0 I(46,0) I(49,0) II(45,0) II(48,0)
W45[6]⊕W47[6] = 0 I(47,2) I(49,2) I(51,2)
W44[6]⊕W46[6] = 0 I(46,2) I(48,2) I(50,2)
W35[4]⊕W39[29] = 0 I(45,0) I(48,0) II(47,0)
W53[29]⊕W56[29] = 1 I(52,0) II(48,0) II(49,0)
W51[29]⊕W54[29] = 1 I(50,0) II(46,0) II(47,0)
W50[29]⊕W52[29] = 1 I(49,0) I(51,0) II(45,0)
W49[29]⊕W51[29] = 1 I(48,0) I(50,0) I(52,0)
W48[29]⊕W50[29] = 1 I(47,0) I(49,0) I(51,0)
W47[29]⊕W49[29] = 1 I(46,0) I(48,0) I(50,0)
W46[29]⊕W48[29] = 1 I(45,0) I(47,0) I(49,0)
W45[29]⊕W47[29] = 1 I(44,0) I(46,0) I(48,0)
W44[29]⊕W46[29] = 1 I(43,0) I(45,0) I(47,0)
W40[4]⊕W42[4] = 1 I(44,0) I(46,0) II(56,0)
W39[4]⊕W41[4] = 1 I(43,0) I(45,0) II(55,0)
W38[4]⊕W40[4] = 1 I(44,0) II(54,0) II(56,0)
W37[4]⊕W39[4] = 1 I(43,0) II(53,0) II(55,0)
W41[1]⊕W42[6] = 1 I(48,2) II(46,2) II(51,2)
W40[1]⊕W41[6] = 1 I(47,2) I(51,2) II(50,2)
W39[1]⊕W40[6] = 1 I(46,2) I(50,2) II(49,2)
W36[1]⊕W37[6] = 1 I(47,2) I(50,2) II(46,2)
W58[29]⊕W59[29] = 0 II(51,0) II(54,0)
W57[29]⊕W58[29] = 0 II(50,0) II(53,0)
W56[29]⊕W57[29] = 0 II(49,0) II(52,0)
W48[6]⊕W50[6] = 0 I(50,2) II(46,2)
W47[6]⊕W49[6] = 0 I(49,2) I(51,2)
W46[6]⊕W48[6] = 0 I(48,2) I(50,2)
W43[6]⊕W45[6] = 0 I(47,2) I(49,2)
W42[6]⊕W44[6] = 0 I(46,2) I(48,2)
W50[6]⊕W51[1] = 0 I(50,2) II(46,2)
W47[6]⊕W48[1] = 0 I(47,2) II(51,2)
W46[6]⊕W47[1] = 0 I(46,2) II(50,2)
W42[6]⊕W43[1] = 0 II(46,2) II(51,2)
W41[6]⊕W42[1] = 0 I(51,2) II(50,2)
W40[6]⊕W41[1] = 0 I(50,2) II(49,2)
W56[4]⊕W59[29] = 0 II(52,0) II(54,0)
W55[4]⊕W58[29] = 0 II(51,0) II(53,0)
W54[4]⊕W57[29] = 0 II(50,0) II(52,0)
W53[4]⊕W56[29] = 0 II(49,0) II(51,0)
W39[4]⊕W43[29] = 0 I(52,0) II(51,0)
W38[4]⊕W42[29] = 0 I(51,0) II(50,0)
W37[4]⊕W41[29] = 0 I(50,0) II(49,0)
W35[3]⊕W39[28] = 0 I(51,0) II(47,0)
W63[0]⊕W64[5] = 1 I(48,0) II(48,0)
W62[0]⊕W63[5] = 1 I(47,0) II(47,0)
W61[0]⊕W62[5] = 1 I(46,0) II(46,0)
W60[0]⊕W61[5] = 1 I(45,0) II(45,0)
W56[29]⊕W59[29] = 1 II(51,0) II(52,0)
W48[29]⊕W55[29] = 1 I(51,0) I(52,0)
W36[4]⊕W38[4] = 1 II(52,0) II(54,0)
W63[1]⊕W64[6] = 1 I(45,0) II(45,0)
W61[2]⊕W62[7] = 1 I(46,2) II(46,2)
W44[1]⊕W45[6] = 1 I(51,2) II(49,2)
W37[1]⊕W38[6] = 1 I(48,2) I(51,2)
W35[1]⊕W36[6] = 1 I(46,2) I(49,2)
Table 5: Remaining unavoidable bit conditions
UBC DV of UBC UBC DV of UBC
W59[29]⊕W60[29] = 0 II(52,0) W53[6]⊕W55[6] = 0 II(51,2)
W52[6]⊕W54[6] = 0 II(50,2) W51[6]⊕W53[6] = 0 II(49,2)
W49[6]⊕W51[6] = 0 I(51,2) W41[6]⊕W43[6] = 0 I(47,2)
W40[6]⊕W42[6] = 0 I(46,2) W37[1]⊕W37[6] = 0 I(51,2)
W55[6]⊕W56[1] = 0 II(51,2) W54[6]⊕W55[1] = 0 II(50,2)
W53[6]⊕W54[1] = 0 II(49,2) W51[6]⊕W52[1] = 0 I(51,2)
W49[6]⊕W50[1] = 0 I(49,2) W48[6]⊕W49[1] = 0 I(48,2)
W45[6]⊕W46[1] = 0 II(49,2) W39[6]⊕W40[1] = 0 I(49,2)
W57[4]⊕W59[29] = 0 II(55,0) W60[4]⊕W64[29] = 0 II(56,0)
W60[5]⊕W64[30] = 0 I(44,0) W59[4]⊕W63[29] = 0 II(55,0)
W59[5]⊕W63[30] = 0 I(43,0) W58[4]⊕W62[29] = 0 II(54,0)
W57[4]⊕W61[29] = 0 II(53,0) W44[3]⊕W48[28] = 0 II(56,0)
W44[4]⊕W48[29] = 0 II(56,0) W43[3]⊕W47[28] = 0 II(55,0)
W43[4]⊕W47[29] = 0 II(55,0) W42[3]⊕W46[28] = 0 II(54,0)
W42[4]⊕W46[29] = 0 II(54,0) W41[3]⊕W45[28] = 0 II(53,0)
W41[4]⊕W45[29] = 0 II(53,0) W40[3]⊕W44[28] = 0 II(52,0)
W40[4]⊕W44[29] = 0 II(52,0) W39[3]⊕W43[28] = 0 II(51,0)
W39[5]⊕W43[30] = 0 II(51,2) W38[3]⊕W42[28] = 0 II(50,0)
W38[5]⊕W42[30] = 0 II(50,2) W37[3]⊕W41[28] = 0 II(49,0)
W37[5]⊕W41[30] = 0 II(49,2) W36[3]⊕W40[28] = 0 II(48,0)
W35[5]⊕W39[30] = 0 I(51,2) W59[0]⊕W64[30] = 1 I(44,0)
W58[0]⊕W63[30] = 1 I(43,0) W58[29]⊕W61[29] = 1 II(53,0)
W55[29]⊕W58[29] = 1 II(50,0) W52[1]⊕W56[1] = 1 II(51,2)
W51[1]⊕W55[1] = 1 II(50,2) W50[1]⊕W54[1] = 1 II(49,2)
W47[1]⊕W51[1] = 1 II(46,2) W46[1]⊕W48[1] = 1 II(51,2)
W45[1]⊕W47[1] = 1 II(50,2) W43[1]⊕W51[1] = 1 I(50,2)
W42[1]⊕W50[1] = 1 I(49,2) W38[0]⊕W43[30] = 1 II(51,2)
W38[1]⊕W40[1] = 1 I(49,2) W38[4]⊕W39[4] = 1 I(52,0)
W37[0]⊕W42[30] = 1 II(50,2) W37[4]⊕W38[4] = 1 I(51,0)
W36[0]⊕W41[30] = 1 II(49,2) W36[4]⊕W37[4] = 1 I(50,0)
W63[2]⊕W64[7] = 1 I(48,2) W62[1]⊕W63[6] = 1 I(44,0)
W62[2]⊕W63[7] = 1 I(47,2) W61[1]⊕W62[6] = 1 I(43,0)
W39[30]⊕W44[28] = 1 II(52,0) W38[30]⊕W43[28] = 1 II(51,0)
W37[30]⊕W42[28] = 1 II(50,0) W36[30]⊕W41[28] = 1 II(49,0)
W35[30]⊕W40[28] = 1 II(48,0)
